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Is a Partnership Under the Uniform
Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?
A. Ladru Jensen*
Professor Jensen reviews the conflict between the aggregate and
entity theories of partnership. The author concludes that neither theory
can be used to explain satisfactorily the results of all problems arising
under the Uniform Partnership Act.
Soon a half century will have passed since the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, held at Washington, D.C., ap-
proved the eighth and final draft of the "Act to Make Uniform the
Law of Partnership" (hereinafter called the "act") on October 14,
1914.'
The first committee appointed to draft the act in 1902 was chaired
by Dean James Barr Ames of Harvard Law School.2 The original
charge to the committee was to draft a uniform act based on the
mercantile or entity theory,3 adopted by the civil law countries.
The drafting committee was staffed in large part by practicing lawyers,
psychologically imbued with stare decisis, who had practised part-
nership law under the common law aggregate doctrine that a partner-
ship was not a legal person in addition to the natural persons who
were the partners. Nevertheless the two first drafts contained a single
definition that a partnership was a legal person. That definition was
never adopted.
4
* Professor of Law, University of Utah; Member, Utah, California, and American
Bar Associations; Editor and Chief Author, Cooperative Corporation Law 1950, Am.
Inst. of Cooperation, Washington, D.C.
1. UNnFORm PA NrEsmI, AcT [hereinafter cited as U.P.A.]. The act was adopted
in 40 states and in Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia through
December 31, 1962. In 1961 Tennessee exempted associations of three or more persons
engaged in a profession or occupation for profit from provisions of the act. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 61-105(3) (Supp. 1962). For general background information and annotations,
see volume 7 of UNrroPm LAws ANN. [hereinafter cited as U.L.A.]
2. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 Haav. L. REv. 762, 769
(1915).
3. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act--A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HAv.
L. REv. 158, 159 (1915). See also Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YArE
L.J. 617 (1915). See also In Succession of PFilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887).
Louisiana early adopted the entity view regarding ownership of partnership property.
The court denied any family allowance to the infant son of a deceased partner, the
partner being insolvent except for his claim against the firm. The court said, "'The
ideal being thus recognized by a fiction of law is the owner .. "' Id. at 932.
4. LEwis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 Hanv.
L. REv. 158, 165 (1915).
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Dean Ames, who was loyally wedded to the entity theory of part-
nership, pursued his efforts to secure support for his views on each of
the succeeding sections and subdivisions wherever he and his col-
leagues regarded the entity idea of the civil law as superior to the
burdensome rules of common law partnerships. Illustrative are pro-
visions designed to obviate the dangers of the concept of joint prop-
erty5 subject to a partner's liens in favor of firm creditors which by
successive transfers would be wiped out,6 and the disastrous rule that
a partner's creditor had a right to interrupt or destroy the continuity
of the firm by attaching and selling firm property to satisfy a partner's
non-firm debt.7  After seven years as draftsman, chairman Dean
Ames died in 1909 and Dean William Draper Lewis was appointed
as chairman of the committee.
Partly as a result of the deep cleavage between members of the
committee on the entity-aggregate controversy the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws directed the reorganized committee to consider the
subject at large and disregard the original directive to draft an act on
the entity theory.
8
More important perhaps was a reason implied from a further stated
objection namely, "that the constitutions of some states made a legal
but non-natural person a corporation." 9 Before the final draft was
unanimously approved, the sixteenth amendment and a federal in-
come tax thereunder had both become law. It may have been thought
that a clear entity definition of partnership might lead to income
taxation of a partnership as an entity. This has in fact resulted for
business trusts in spite of their partnership characteristics. 10
This late, radical switch to a committee directive not to continue to
draft the act on the entity view but to work on the project "at large'
made it virtually inevitable that the final draft of the proposed act
would reveal strong internal evidence of compromise, and so it did.
The seven years of work by the committee with Dean Ames as drafts-
man accomplished so many committee agreements on specific pro-
visions based on the entity concept that these provisions were bound
5. Heydon v. Heydon, I Salk. 392, 91 Eng. Rep. 340 (K.B. 1936).
6. Case v. Beauregard, 99 U.S. 119 (1879).
7. Doner v. Stauffer, 1 Pen. & W. 198 (Pa. 1829).
8. Lewis, supra note 4, at 159.
9. Id. at 165.
10. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (192-5). In many states all
business trusts regarded as partnerships for the purpose of personal liability of the
beneficiaries. Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143 (1926);
Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925).
In other states business trusts are held to be partnerships for purposes of liability only
when the beneficiaries by the trust agreement are interpreted to be multiple principals
with the rights to direct the trustees as their agents. Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal.
408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N.E.
355 (1913).
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to appear in the act. It is fair to say that the Ames committee was
victorious in securing approval of the entity view in a score of specific,
substantive provisions of the act wherein the law needed alteration,"
while the Lewis committee won approval of exclusion of the right of
the firm to sue and be sued and inclusion of a definition of partnership
as an aggregate association.' 2 This compromise produced ambiguities
between the numerous specific provisions of the act espousing the en-
tity principle and the act's general aggregate definition. These
ambiguities became, and to a considerable degree still remain, a
source of legal controversy as different problems arise.
That the act adopts both the entity and the aggregate theory of
partnership, depending upon the particular problem involved was the
position of Professor Crane, as his view is succinctly summarized in
the reply of Dean Lewis: "That though the intention of the draftsmen
was apparently to proceed on the aggregate theory, the Act does
not explicitly adopt either the entity or the aggregate theory of the
nature of a partnership."'
3
The reply of Dean Lewis to Mr. Crane's clear exposition of what the
act says in its specific provisions on partnership as an entity is a
confession and legally novel attempt at avoidance, albeit an eco-
nomically sound explanation that the natural person partners are
annual economic beneficiaries of partnership operations. Dean Lewis
could not avoid the admission that the act while defining the partner-
ship as an aggregate association in section 6, also defines a partnership
as a "person" in section 2.14
He admits that section 9 declares a new relationship unknown to
the common law in making the partners the agents of the partner-
ship. 15 He also admits that the act creates new law contrary to the
property concepts of partnerships at common law by providing that
"Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name.
Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name."'
6
11. The following sections of the U.P.A. contain references to a partnership as an
entity: §§ 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35(1)(b),
40(a)II, (h) and (i). They recognize in different particulars that a partnership is an
entity distinct from its partner members in contract, tort, property rights and duties
and in the relations of the partners to the partnership and in the strong but con-
ditional insulation of the separate creditors of the partners from partnership property.
12. "A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit." U.P.A. § 6(1).
13. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 158. Professor Crane writing a little over twenty
years later again declared negatively, "The Act cannot be said to have definitely
settled the question of whether the partnership form of association is to be treated as a
legal entity or not." Crane, Twenty Years Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 2 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 129, 132 (1936).
14. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HAv.
L. Plv. 291, 293 (1916).
15. Id. at 294, 299-300.
16. U.P.A. § 8(3). See Lewis, supra note 14, at 292.
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He agrees that sections 24 to 28 inclusive create a new and unique
type of tenancy, unknown to the common law, now known as a
tenancy in partnership.17 He concedes that this new tenancy in part-
nership limits the property interest of the partners in partnership
assets strictly to their "possession" for partnership purposes only, and
that their relationship to the firm assets is indirect, like that of stock-
holders in a profit-corporation: a bundle of choses in action.'8 He
could hardly deny the uncontradictable result of the clear language of
the act which makes the partnership a juridical person in substantive
law in owning and using partnership real estate when it declares that
firm property "is not subject to dower, courtesy, or allowance to
widows, heirs, or next of kin."19
How then could Dean Lewis make a legally plausible argument
that the twenty or more distinct modifications of the common law now
written into the act in the direction of creating a partnership entity
did not accomplish the result in those particular matters which Dean
Ames had sought so diligently, for so long, to accomplish?
To do so, Dean Lewis adopted an explanation which, perhaps in-
advertently, recognized the partnership as a legal entity. He in-
geniously analogized the firm as a (non-profit) trustee, admittedly
owning firm assets, but operating exclusively for the economic benefit
of its participating partners.20 That Lewis theory, although legally
logical and economically sound, has not, since the first adoptions of
the act in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin in 192521 received judicial
approval as a harmonious integration of the compound entity-
aggregate phases of a U.P.A. partnership. However that non-profit
trustee or trustee-agent and multiple beneficiaries theory has found
repeated judicial approval in cases providing a sound legal explana-
tion for the relationship between an incorporated, non-profit coopera-
tive and its actively participating members or stockholders, where
income tax treatment is the same as for a partnership. 22
The following legal test of a true cooperative as trustee-agent for its
members supplies the missing legal requirement which would support
Dean Lewis' partnership as a trustee entity for its partners. There
must be an obligation of the non-profit entity prior to receipt of in-
17. U.P.A. §§ 25-28. This point is also discussed in Lewis, The Uniform Part-
nership Act, 24 YL.IE L.J. 617, 629-34 (1915).
18. "A Partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus,
and the same is personal property." U.P.A. § 26. No annual-accounting is required
by the act.
19. Id. §25 ()(e).
20. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 14, at 309.
21. See note 1 supra.
22. See Jensen, Cooperative Corporation Law on the Marketing Transaction, 22
WAsH. L. RE . 1, 8-15 (1947) and Jensen, The Federal Income Tax Status of Non-
exempt Cooperatives, 6 UTA L. REv. 23, 38-39 (1958).
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come to allocate and distribute to its members the annual net receipts
above expenses.23
What is the problem? It is primarily one of legally explaining the
scope and purposes of an incomplete, hybrid legal personality. The
initial problem appears to be basically psychological. Laymen, law-
yers and many judges conceive artificial legal personality as either
black or white-a firm must have all the powers of a competent
natural person or none. Thus Professor James Parsons in an early
comment on the problem implied that it would be necessary in the
codification of partnership law to adopt either the entity or the ag-
gregate view. He wrote: "They stumble and halt on the very thres-
hold. The definition of partnership breaks them all up. Having no
guiding principle to start with how can they create a system."2 It
requires difficult legal ratiocination to conceive of a juristic entity as
existing for purposes of contract, tort and property ownership without
analogizing the entity with that of a private-profit corporation-a
juristic person all the way. But it should be obvious that a partner-
ship may be an entity for some purposes and not for others.
Cooperative corporate association law, as it has developed over the
past half century, legally verbalizes the true economic purpose and
result of operation of a non-profit corporation as a trustee or agent, or
both, for its unidentified, limited-liability members.2
5
Dean Lewis agreed that the grouping of rights and duties in part-
nership as an additional entity was like the activities of a trustee in
dealing with the trust estate for the benefit of the cestuis. He is right.
The problem is one of securing a satisfactory legal explanation for a
particular type of unincorporated association, which is provided with
numerous but not all statutory powers identical with those possessed
corporations. Primary liabilities of partners are still preserved.
I. Tim LEGAL EssENTIALs OF JURISTIC PERSONALITY
The corporation codes of all the states indicate the basic essentials
of corporate personality. They are that the entity have its own name,
a continuous life separate from that of its stockholders, the rights to
contract, to acquire, to manage, and to dispose of real and personal
property, to be solely liable for torts, and the right to sue and be
sued.2 Other special rights are not indispensable. Whether stock-
holders are made liable for the debts of the corporation is not de-
terminative of corporate personality, although it is good law that
23. United Cooperatives, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 93 (1944). The reasoning
of this case was approved in American Box Shook Export Ass'n v. Commissioner, 156
F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1946).
24. PA SONS, PARTNnSM xiii (1867).
25. Notes 22, 23 supra.
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-117 (1956).
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stockholders' liability on a contract entered into by the corporation is
not primary, but a statutory imposed obligation when it exists.
The act grants to a partnership the same rights and imposes on it
the same liabilities that a corporate person has, except that a firm
is not granted by the act the right to sue and be sued in its own name.
Also, it is not granted continuity of life by the statute except to the
limited extent that no separate creditor of a partner can interfere with
the life of the firm for the duration thereof as agreed upon by the
partners, but can reach the choses in action which are the debtor
partner's rights against the firm only indirectly through an equitable
charging order.27 Again death works a dissolutionF but not a termi-
nation 9 of a partnership. A firm may be dissolved for several other
causes. 20
The cases generally hold that the contractual liability of the part-
ners under section 15(b) are additional contractual liabilities, which
are regarded generally as primary liabilities.3' However, the New
York rule as to the liability of the estate of a deceased partner is that
the partnership as an entity is primarily liable and the liability of the
deceased partner's estate is secondary in nature.'
II. PARTNERSHIPS BiGHT To SuE OR BE SurD
A study of the partnership cases under the act impresses one with
the importance of a procedural right to sue and be sued to effect full
entity standing before the courts. All or nearly all states have statutes
requiring the filing of assumed or fictitious partnership names with
the county clerk or recorder. Most of such statutes make the act of
doing firm business without filing a misdemeanor. Many of them
make filing a condition precedent to an action by the partners or the
partnership.3
England granted partnerships the right to sue and be sued in the
partnership name by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875.4 Two
27. U.P.A. § 28. See Weisinger v. Rae, 19 Misc. 2d 341, 188 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup.
Ct. 1959) and numerous cases in Annot., 7 U.L.A. § 28.
28. U.P.A. § 29. Dissolution is caused by a partner ceasing to be associated in the
carrying on of the business.
29. U.P.A. § 30. Dissolution does not cause termination of a firm. This occurs when
there is a winding up of the firm.
30. U.P.A. §§ 31, 32.
31. Ceisenhoff v. Mabrey, 58 Cal. App. 481, 137 P.2d 36 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943);
Thomas v. Benson, 264 Mass. 555, 163 N.E. 181 (1928); Wheatley v. Carl M. Halvor-
son, Inc., 213 Ore. 228, 323 P.2d 49 (1958).
32. Friedman v. Gettner, 6 App. Div. 2d 647, 180 N.Y.S.2d 446, aff'd, 194 N.Y.S.2d
35, 7 N.Y.2d 764, 163 N.E.2d 141 (1959). "Liability of copartners is joint and
several only when joint property is inadequate to pay partnership debts, or there is
no effective remedy without resort to individual property." 180 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
33. Uhlmann v. Kin Daw, 97 Ore. 681, 193 Pac. 435 (1920) summarizes dif-
ferent types of assumed name statutes.
34. LnDLEY, PARNrimsrn, 344 (7th ed. 1924).
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states, Texas5 and Oklahoma,36 have statutes allowing joint stock
associations to sue as parties plaintiff.
A number of states have statutes allowing partnerships to be sued
or have reached that result by judicial construction of the act. In these
jurisdictions a judgment against the partnership is valid and execution
thereon may be levied only on partnership property. Included in this
group are California,37 New Jersey m  New York,39 Tennessee,40 and
Utah.4'
Missouri, on the other hand, held that when suit had been filed and
judgment entered against the partnership in the firm name without
any procedural statute authorizing such suit, the judgment was a
nullity.4 2 One law review article suggests that because in Ohio a
partnership can neither sue nor be sued, the Ohio cases "overall take
the aggregate view."43 This writer suggests that if a section 8 case
arose in Ohio wherein the partnership had purchased real estate in an
assumed firm name and specific performance had to be brought in the
names of the partners, the equity court should regard such suit as a
representative one, similar to a stockholders derivative suit, and decree
that the defendant convey the realty to the firm in the firm name,
as section 8 clearly states that realty may be acquired, held, and
conveyed in the firm name.
III. LARGE MAJOmTY OF STATES ADOPT ENT=I Vmw
FOR VAIous SuBsTANTIVE LAW PuRPOsEs
While the Missouri Supreme Court has held that a judgment against
a partnership in the partnership name is void,'4 the same court in 1959
declared: "[T]he Act 'is consistent with the entity approach for the
35. Graham v. Omar Gasoline Co., 253 S.W. 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) construed
the statute to apply to business trusts, all of which are partnerships in Texas. Thomp-
son v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925).
36. General Am. Oil Co. v. Wagoner Oil & Gas Co., 118 Okla. 183, 247 Pac. 99
(1925).
37. Deeney v. Hotel & Apartment Clerks' Union, 57 Cal. App. 2d 1023, 134 P.2d
328 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
38. Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 170 A.2d 241 (1961).
39. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Unger, 4 Misc. 2d 955, 158 N.Y.S.2d 892, 896 (Sup.
Ct. 1956). "[U]nder . . . the Civil Practice Act a partnership is to be regarded as a
legal entity for the purposes of pleading."
40. Karns v. Loftis, 1 Tenn. App. 574 (E.S. 1925).
41. Hamnar v. B. K. Bloch & Co., 16 Utah 436, 52 Pac. 770 (1898). UTAH
Comvip. LAws § 3191 (1888) gave the right to sue a partnership as an entity. Execution
was limited to joint property. Accord under the act: Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 81
Utah 372, 18 P.2d 299 (1933). Dictum: An award of workmen's compensation
against the partnership alone would be limited to partnership property. The partners
are jointly, not severally, liable under § 15(b) of the act.
42. Davison v. Farr, 273 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. App. 1954).
43. Mathews & Folkerth, Ohio Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act, 9
Omo ST. L.J. 616 (1948).
44. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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purposes of facilitating transfers of property, marshaling assets and
protecting the business operation against the immediate impact of
personal involvements of the partners.",
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated the matter in different
language: "[I]n divers respects a partnership may... come within the
legal conception of a distinctive being, viz., an entity."46
IV. PA TNFRSHP EN=Y-SomFTn mEs YES SOmVETM s No
It is now apparent from the foregoing that whether a partnership
is to be regarded as an entity under the act will and should be gov-
erned by the particular question to be decided by the appellate court
of the particular state jurisdiction or of a federal court following state
substantive law under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.47
Many generalizations are found in the various decisions stating that
a partnership is not an entity separate from the partners.48 When
45. McKinney v. Truck Ins. Exch., 324 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Mo. App. 1959), quoting
Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 148 A.2d 8, 11 (1959). Semble: Silberfeld
v. Swiss Bank Corp., 273 App. Div. 686, 79 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (1948) ("For the
purpose of marshaling assets equity will regard the partnership as a legal entity.. .. ");
Cultra v. Cultra, 188 Tenn. 506, 221 S.W.2d 533 (1949) (real estate purchased with
partnership funds for partnership purposes thereby converted into personalty by
U.P.A. and remains such for purposes of descent and distribution); see U.P.A. § 40(h).
46. Finston v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 132 N.J.L. 276, 39 A.2d 697,
698 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Naidech v. U.C.C., 134 N.J.L. 232,
46 A.2d 734 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); accord, Zion v. Sentry Safety Control Corp.,
258 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1958); Buckley v. Chadwick, 274 P.2d 673 (Cal. App. 1954),
vacated, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ("[E]ach partner is an agent
of the firm, and, as in any other case of agency, his acts are held to engage his
principal's delietual as well as contractual liability." 274 P.2d at 680); Park v.
Union Mfg. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 401, 114 P.2d 373 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) ("[In
those jurisdictions where the Roman law is the basis of the jurisprudence, the entity
of the partnership is frankly recognized, and actions are even allowed between the
partner and the partnership." 114 P.2d at 375); Gerding v. Baier, 143 Md. 520, 122
Ad. 675 (1923) (contract for continuation of partnership for 5 years after partner's
death held binding against petition of heirs for receivership); Ryder's Case, 341 Mass.
661, 171 N.E.2d 475 (1961); Chisholm v. Chisholm Constr. Co., 298 Mich. 25, 298
N.W. 390 (1941) ("[Iln order to prevent an injustice or fraud, we do not hesitate
to disregard the fictional entity of the partnership .... " Id. at 30, 298 N.W. at 393);
Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947); Southard v.
Oil Equip. Corp., 296 P.2d 780 (Okla. 1956); Brooks v. Ulanet, 116 Vt. 49, 68 A.2d
701 (1949).
Generally partners are not employees of the firm of which they are members and
therefore not covered by workmen's compensation laws, but under UTAu CODn ANN.
§ 36-1-43(4) (1953), partners may elect to come under the act and the salary or
wage is then set at $400 per month for rate making purposes.
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. State v. Spears, 57 N.M. 400, 259 P.2d 356 (1953). A firm is not an entity
for criminal responsibility. Cases generally declaring no entity are: Neustadter v.
United Exposition Serv. Co., 14 N.J. Super. 484, 82 A.2d 476 (Ch. 1951) (See notes
38 & 46 supra, New Jersey cases contra on specific problems); Angell v. White
Eagle Oil & Ref. Co., 169 Minn. 183, 210 N.W. 1004 (1926) (See note 56 infra for
later Minnesota case contra); Lewis v. West Side Trust & Say. Bank, 377 Ill. 384, 36
N.E.2d 573 (1941) (See note 54 infra for Illinois case contra on property ownership);
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such cases are carefully analyzed they frequently rest on the absence
of a procedural statute granting the right to a partnership to sue or be
sued or upon some specific legal question not coming under the
twenty-odd specific sections of the act listed in note 11, creating an
entity for some specific purpose.
The Pennsylvania case of McElhinney v. Belsky49 is illustrative.
A "partnership," unlike a corporation, is not a legal entity having as such
a domicile or residence separate and distinct from that of the individuals
who compose it, but is rather a relation or status between two or more
persons who unite their labor or property to carry on a business for profit,
except that it is treated by legal fiction as a quasi person or entity for such.
purposes as keeping of partnership accounts and marshaling assets.50
It is interesting to observe that the same Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ten years after the McElhinney case held that a partnership was
an entity for receipt of income and therefore subject to the Phila-
delphia income tax ordinance for purposes of taxation.51
Two leading cases illustrate the willingness of the courts to adopt
the entity approach when business utility or the implications of the
act seem to require it. One is Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America.52
Defendant company issued an automobile liability policy insuring
"Hartigan and Dwyer No. 85-91 Congress St., Troy, Rensselaer Coun-
ty, New York, department store merchant," against loss and expense
by reason of claims made against the assured. The plaintiffs, Hartigan
and Dwyer, were members of two partnerships, one carrying on
business at the address listed in the policy, the second one being
located at Albany, New York. This second firm included an additional
member, one John O'Brien. An automobile while being used in the
business of the Albany firm was negligently operated and killed a
child. The plaintiffs paid, as a compromise settlement, two-thirds of
the amount of the claim against the Albany firm and on its first appeal
had recovered a judgment against the Casualty Company for that
amount in an action on the policy.
The court of appeals reversed the appellate division and held unani-
Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935) (See notes 32 & 39 supia,
which are contra for different specified purposes).
49. 165 Pa. Super. 546, 69 A.2d 178 (1949).
50. 69 A.2d at 179. It should be noted however that the statutory definition requir-
ing that a partnership must be engaged for profit is not observed as mandatory when
the question of liability of members of a non-profit unincorporated consumers or
purchasing cooperative comes before the courts. See Tyrrell v. Washburn, 88 Mass.
(6 Allen) 466 (1863); Ashley v. Dowling, 203 Mass. 311, 89 N.E. 434 (1909); IN-r.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1385(b) (2) (Act of 1962) provides that mandatory patronage
refunds of a purchasing cooperative "attributed to personal, living or family items" are
not taxable income by savings only,
51. Quaid v. Tax Review Bd., 188 Pa. Super. 623, 149 A.2d 557 (1959).
52. 227 N.Y. 175, 124 N.E. 789 (1919).
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mously that the unambiguous words of the policy insured the part-
nership (entity) located at Troy and not the partners as aggregate
members of the partnership at Albany in which O'Brien was also a
member. The firm of Hartigan and Dwyer had "committed no wrong
and incurred no liability"5 3 at its Albany place of business.
Another leading case is Wharf v. Wharfs which involved rights of
the surviving partner, the son of a father-and-son real estate partner-
ship, to deal with real estate and to grant clear title to purchasers of
parcels of land purchased by them on installment contracts. A bill
was brought by the surviving partner against the widow and other
children of the deceased for a declaration of his rights as surviving
partner.
The judgment of the trial court denying relief on the bill because
no equitable relief was needed, was affirmed. The court by dicta de-
,clared that under the tenancy in partnership the entity continued for
purposes of winding up the firm and indicated that the conveyances
were to be made to purchasers in the firm name. The heirs received
no rights in real estate which, by fiction, was equitably converted
under the statute to personalty for purposes of descent. Nor could
the heirs interfere with the orderly liquidation of the firm as an entity.
The foregoing supports the conclusion of the Minnesota Supreme
Court of two decades ago that in the specific problems that have arisen
under about twenty sections of the act,55 namely, "The modem
tendency... is to treat a partnership as distinct from and independent
of the individuals composing it."
56
In all states having the Uniform Partnership Act the firm is recog-
nized as an entity for owning its own property and property rights.
Practically all such states grant literal recognition to the declaration
,of section 9 of the act, which declares that in matters of contract
-the active partners are agents of the partnership. Contractual liability
-of the partnership carries with it the added primary liability of both
.dormant and active partners.
Except for one lone Pennsylvania case which held that a partnership
-had its own entity income for income tax purposes, 57 partnerships
have been uniformly treated as non-profit trustees of their members
(not including business trusts having partnership liability. )58 It is un-
fortunate that the simple legal explanation of a partnership as a non-
profit trustee for its members, a concept so well established in
-cooperative law, has not been adopted by the courts to rationalize the
53. 124 N.E. at 790.
54. 306 IlM. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922).
55. Note 11 supra.
56. Gleason v. Sing, 210 Minn. 253, 297 N.W. 720 (1941).
57. Quaid v. Tax Review Bd., supra note 51.
58. Note 10 supra.
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economic purpose and result of partnership operation. Perhaps the
missing fact is that few if any partnership articles ever spell out an
obligation of the trustee partnership to make an annual accounting to
its members, both dormant and active, as is required for agricultural
cooperatives. 59 As has been pointed out, Dean Lewis, except for a
mandatory accounting contract, argued for the firm trustee concept
almost four decades ago.60
The conflict in entity versus aggregate views of a partnership is
materially lessened in those jurisdictions which have removed the
procedural disability of partnerships to be sued in their own names.61
The advantages secured by having a procedural statute allowing part-
nerships to be sued in their own names argue strongly for the adoption
of such act in all of the states having the Uniform Partnership Act, as
is indicated by the foregoing analysis.
The recognition of the Internal Revenue laws of partnerships as an
aggregate for purposes of income taxation 62 will most surely long
continue, even though partnerships may be sued in their own names,
because small unincorporated businesses need the economic advantage
of a single tax on the income allocated to the members to grant them
much needed aid in the competition of the market place.
59. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1388(a)(2).
60. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
61. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
62. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 701-711(c).
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